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# **South Africa and Its Regional Policies Through the 1980s**

**National Intelligence Estimate**

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## **SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS REGIONAL POLICIES THROUGH THE 1980s**

Information available as of 21 November 1984 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.

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## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
SCOPE NOTE .....	v
KEY JUDGMENTS .....	1
DISCUSSION .....	5
The Setting .....	5
South Africa's Perceptions and Goals .....	7
The Regional Military Situation .....	9
The South African Defense Force (SADF) .....	9
Military Capabilities of the Neighboring States .....	11
Regional Economic Considerations .....	12
South Africa's Internal Economic Situation .....	12
South Africa's Economic Options .....	13
Prospects for Economic Growth in the 1980s .....	13
The Regional Economic Situation .....	13
Prospects for the Regional Economies .....	16
South African Internal Politics .....	17
Outlook and Implications .....	21
Outlook .....	21
Implications .....	22
For Black Africa .....	22
For the Soviets .....	23
For the United States .....	23
For the West .....	23

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## SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate assesses the major changes in South Africa and the southern African region in recent years, such as:

- The growth of South Africa's military and economic strength.
- The corresponding political, economic, and military weaknesses of the black neighboring states.
- The determination of South Africa to project its power regionally, using military and economic threats and incentives, to deprive South African insurgents of bases and safehavens in the neighboring states.
- The negotiation of a series of arrangements between Pretoria and individual black African regimes to solidify South African regional hegemony.
- The new constitutional changes in South Africa that bring Coloreds and Indians into limited partnership with whites.

The paper also addresses factors that may inhibit South Africa's power projections, including:


- Political divisions within the Afrikaner community.
- Continued racial discrimination and sporadic violence in South Africa.
- An international embargo of arms to South Africa and its effect on the military.
- The long-term decline of gold production in the Republic.
- The continued provision of Soviet weapons and advisers to Angola and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique.
- The presence of Cuban combat forces in Angola.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the nature of South Africa's regional accommodations and their durability for the remainder of the 1980s. The Estimate also addresses in general terms the likely implications of these developments for the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union and its allies, and the rest of black Africa. Although the paper discusses the probable South African relationship with an independent Namibia, it does not examine the processes by which Namibia may reach independence, nor does it deal with the intricacies of a Cuban

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withdrawal from Angola or the disengagement of South African forces from Angola.



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## KEY JUDGMENTS

Since the collapse of Portugal's colonial empire in southern Africa in the mid-1970s—and the resultant projection of Soviet and Cuban power into the region—South Africa has attempted to shape the regional political environment to meet its own security needs. Pretoria has already compelled some of its black-ruled neighbors to accept bilateral security agreements through which it is attempting to impose a "Pax Pretoriana" throughout southern Africa.<sup>1</sup> Although there may be periods of tension between South Africa and its neighbors, we do not envisage a scenario developing during the rest of the 1980s in which South African hegemony declines to the point that neighboring countries would feel less threatened by South Africa.

South Africa is the dominant military power in southern Africa. Its forces are not only larger and more efficient than those of any of the neighboring black states, but are also highly motivated, well disciplined, and thoroughly trained. Because of the international arms embargo against South Africa, Pretoria has fostered an extensive indigenous arms production capability and has procured some foreign equipment and technology by both open and clandestine means. Although South Africa lacks the capability to produce high-performance aircraft and helicopters, it will preserve its regional military dominance through the period of this Estimate.

The armed forces of the neighboring black states suffer from poor training, low pay, inadequate housing, a lack of technical skills, severe maintenance and supply problems, and general demoralization. Continuing flows of Communist military equipment to the neighboring states have not compensated for these inherent deficiencies of the black armies, but they are a source of concern to South Africa, even though the military systems delivered so far are primarily defensive.

South African regional economic predominance is even more striking. South Africa will experience only slow economic growth for the rest of the 1980s as a result of the static production in its dominant gold industry. But its economic power is so great in comparison with the faltering economies of its neighbors that the migrant labor, trade, investment, and transportation dependence of the neighbors on South Africa will prevail for many years to come. Whether South Africa will be

<sup>1</sup> The term "Pax Pretoriana" is used in this paper to mean the South African policy of forcing or persuading neighboring governments, preferably through formal agreements, to cooperate with South African authorities to eliminate the physical presence of suspected anti-South African terrorists on their territories.



either willing or able to provide the considerable financial investments that the neighboring states need is more doubtful. Pretoria is already seeking Western commitments of aid to Mozambique and to an independent Namibia, and will try to draw the West more deeply into its regional schemes.

South Africa's pursuit of a Pax Pretoriana throughout the 1980s has serious implications for African and non-African states. Although Pretoria's black neighbors are too weak to challenge South African hegemony, their weakness will not stop their support for Namibian independence, political support for black liberation groups, and majority rule in South Africa. Moreover, Pretoria's goal of a "constellation of states" held together by security agreements and South African economic dominance runs counter to black southern Africa's own hopes of distancing itself from Pretoria. Thus, the black-ruled states of southern Africa will resist South Africa's efforts to dictate their domestic and foreign policy priorities. As they come to realize that they cannot fend off South Africa by themselves, they will seek, even more intensely than they have in the past, the help of Communist and Western states to bring pressure on Pretoria, although they will seek to keep Moscow at arm's length while doing so.

At the moment, Moscow is especially apprehensive that South Africa's recent security agreement with Mozambique and bilateral talks with Angola could diminish the need of those states for Soviet military assistance. Moreover, reverses for Moscow in these two countries undermine Soviet efforts to support the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC). Despite Moscow's concern, the Soviets are restrained by the very weaknesses that beset their black African clients, and they lack the leverage to push those clients beyond the political and military bounds the clients have set for themselves.

While Moscow may have suffered some setbacks, there are no indications that it believes the game has been lost. The Soviets believe they can count on South African intransigence on Namibia's independence and on the growing effectiveness of the Angolan insurgents to demonstrate the need for continued Soviet assistance in Angola. They could also profit in the long run from the disenchantment of the region with its subservience to South Africa. Moscow will also continue to portray the West, particularly the United States, as collaborating with South Africa.

The protracted diplomacy of the United States on southern African issues over the last several years has great potential for advancing US interests. On the other hand, there is a risk of reinforcing the widespread

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perception among Africans that the United States is acquiescing in the South African-imposed order. Also, as South Africa perceives itself stronger, it will become less vulnerable to pressure. Thus, US influence in both the Republic of South Africa and black Africa may suffer.

Pretoria's aid for insurgencies in the region will fluctuate according to overall South African military and political strategy. Until the South Africans can be confident that a Pax Pretoriana has taken hold, they will be reluctant to abandon the leverage that the insurgencies provide. Pretoria hopes that continuing pressures will force the regimes in Angola and Mozambique to come to terms with their internal opponents. Any resultant governments of national unity presumably would reduce the Soviet and Cuban presence in both countries.

South Africa now admits that SWAPO cannot be excluded from participating in an eventual independent government in Namibia. Pretoria will nonetheless try to ensure that important posts go to non-SWAPO parties and that constitutional guarantees preclude a one-party or Marxist state. Such arrangements would help to retain strong South African influence in the country. As for the ANC, its military capabilities will continue to diminish in the wake of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique. South African security forces will probably be able to handle the military challenge from the ANC without too much difficulty for the rest of the 1980s.

But the ongoing violence in South Africa, which increased sharply in August 1984, demonstrates once again that the white regime still faces serious internal security problems. South African security forces are likely to become increasingly preoccupied with random urban terrorism and spontaneous outbreaks of violence, although the government is not likely to face a serious threat to its stability for the period of this Estimate.

South Africa's efforts to impose a Pax Pretoriana stem in large part from its desire to remove its perceived external threat in order to buy time to work out its own solutions to its domestic problems. President Botha has restructured national political institutions and strengthened the positions of the President and the few senior National Party associates who share his commitment to limited constitutional and economic reforms as well as to an aggressive foreign policy.

By this means Botha is creating the institutional framework for making himself the most powerful leader in 20th-century South Africa. For the next few years at least he will dominate the political scene. Botha's only potential political threat lies to the right, but even that threat is manageable, because the National Party base now includes more of the English-speaking electorate. Botha seems well placed to

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enact his programs during the remainder of his scheduled term in office, which corresponds roughly with the period of this Estimate.

During the next five years, South Africa will institutionalize limited constitutional reforms, co-opting as many Coloreds and Indians as possible, and blacks residing in white areas, into a system that will give them only limited political rights but will hold out hope of much greater economic and social advantages.

As more blacks are assigned citizenship in the homelands, South Africa's long-term political strategy will be to find a method to link the homelands permanently to a white republic through some federal or confederal arrangement—a domestic version of the concept of a constellation of states. Botha would like to see such a system created before he leaves office.

Efforts to create that system will be hampered, however, by black resistance, stemming from the government's inability or unwillingness to meet black needs and aspirations. Government efforts to buy off blacks will be stalled by slow economic growth.

If black expectations are not met, blacks will turn increasingly to violence. Black abilities to challenge government policies are limited, but they do exist. Black dissatisfaction during the remainder of this decade will not be sufficiently articulated, however, to bring about major changes. But it may lead to enough unrest to force the government into a steadily escalating use of force, which would add to its pariah status in the international community and seriously complicate US and Western efforts to bring about peaceful social change in South Africa.

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## DISCUSSION

## The Setting

1. The southern African region is in a state of flux.<sup>2</sup> A turbulent period that began in the mid-1970s with the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire is evolving in new directions, currently highlighted by Pretoria's efforts to erect a structure of bilateral agreements between the region's dominant power, white-ruled South Africa, and its black-ruled neighbors. Through these arrangements, South Africa hopes to regulate the intricate strategic relationships of the region.

2. Many factors contributed to the turmoil that the southern African states have experienced during the last several years. These factors include:

- Marxist regimes with Soviet Bloc support came to power in Angola and Mozambique in 1975 following Portugal's precipitate withdrawal from Africa. In Angola, the liberation movements that were excluded from power, particularly the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), mounted what has become a serious insurgent challenge to the authority of the new Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government.
- The Rhodesian civil war, growing in intensity throughout the 1970s, finally forced the white regime to accept a negotiated end to the war and the installation of a black majority government.
- The restive black townships of South Africa erupted violently in June 1976. In the subsequent brutal crackdown by South African security forces, many young blacks fled into exile in neighboring countries where many were recruited into the principal South African liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). The ANC began to mount sporadic cross-border

guerrilla operations into South Africa from bases in neighboring countries.

- The United Nations imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa in late 1977, forcing South Africa to accelerate its efforts to become militarily and economically self-sufficient.

3. South African anxiety about these developments was heightened by the eagerness of the Soviet Union and its allies to exploit them. By the time Pieter Willem (P. W.) Botha became Prime Minister in 1978, South Africa's increasing isolation was apparent. Botha's government attempted to formulate domestic policies to deal with the overriding question of race relationships within the country. However, the government appeared during its first years in office to be devoting most of its time, resources, and energy to meeting the "total onslaught" that it argued was facing South Africa on all borders—hostility from black Africa carefully nurtured by the Soviet Union and its allies. As the 1970s ended, South Africa watched with concern the increasing sophistication of the Soviet-supplied weapon systems of its neighboring countries and the growing military capabilities of the Soviet-supported insurgent movements, particularly the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the ANC.

4. Pretoria was also concerned by efforts of its black neighbors to decrease their economic dependence on the Republic. The emergence of organizations such as the Southern African Development and Coordination Conference (SADCC)<sup>3</sup> did not in Pretoria's view bode well for the South African concept of regional economic cooperation, which in the early days of the Botha era took form as a call for a "constellation of states" with South Africa as the nucleus and the black states as satellites.

5. In attempting to mold the southern African political environment to its liking over the last several years, Pretoria has used a variable mix of political, economic, and military pressures, which has had some success. Some black African states, even those that


<sup>2</sup> For the purposes of this Estimate, southern Africa includes South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Namibia, and Malawi. Zaire, particularly its mineral-rich province of Shaba, is connected to the South African-dominated regional rail system and is, therefore, treated as part of the southern African economic scene. Tanzania is not in the southern Africa region, but is involved in regional political affairs as a Frontline State.

<sup>3</sup> The members of SADCC are: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

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# South Africa: A Regional Perspective



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have received economic and military assistance from either Eastern or Western countries, have not been capable of resisting South African pressure. While South Africa has become stronger over the last decade, its neighbors have been unable to cope effectively with their growing economic and security problems. Thus, one by one, the states of southern Africa have begun to try to work out an accommodation with South Africa.

### South Africa's Perceptions and Goals

6. South Africa sees itself as the dominant power in southern Africa, whose needs must be taken into account, and as an African state that has wrongly been excluded from continental affairs. South Africa also considers itself a geostrategic actor in southern Africa with an important role to play in the East-West global confrontation. South Africa is not interested in persuading others to adopt its ideology or in acquiring additional territory, but it is determined to retain economic and military preeminence in southern Africa.

7. South Africa's regional goals are in large part driven by its domestic political situation. Its leaders have sought to ensure continuing Afrikaner domination, despite virtually universal condemnation of its political and social order. In formulating its regional policies, Pretoria is motivated by the need to buy time to put its domestic affairs in order and to blunt the attacks of both its internal and external critics. To bolster white unity, Pretoria takes a hard line against the ANC and those countries that, by giving the ANC aid and sanctuary, have enabled it to engage in cross-border terrorism against South Africa. Pretoria also wants to ensure that an independent Namibia will be governed by a regime at least not overtly hostile to South Africa. But Pretoria also wants to change the nature of its relations with neighboring states, hoping that in time these states will come to accept South Africa's right to manage its internal affairs.

8. **Immediate Goals and Tactics.** South Africa's immediate goal is to reduce or eliminate the capability of neighboring states to support antiregime movements operating in and out of South Africa and to force them to cooperate with South African authorities to eliminate the physical presence of suspected terrorists on their territories. The South Africans want these and any future commitments codified in treaties, which would also serve to give the appearance of closer bilateral relations with South Africa. The model for these agreements seems to be the recently concluded Nkomati Accord with Mozambique. No change of regime or immediate thawing of relations with the

Republic have so far been demanded of neighboring governments.

9. In connection with these nonaggression treaties, South Africa will offer various inducements. South Africa has revealed the existence of a treaty, similar to the Nkomati accord, that was made two years ago with Swaziland (under which Swaziland may ultimately receive some South African territory to which it has a longstanding tribal claim). Botswana and Lesotho are resisting strong pressures to conclude similar accords. If these arrangements fall into place, Zimbabwe may find itself under the gun to join the others, although we doubt that President Mugabe would enter into a formal agreement.

10. The economic, political, and military weaknesses of the neighboring states provide South Africa with easily exploitable opportunities to pursue its goals. Economic difficulties have increased dramatically over the past 10 to 15 years through a combination of factors:

- Declining terms of trade for primary producers.
- Incompetent state intervention or inept "socialist" policies, particularly in agriculture.
- Destruction, during civil wars, of transport and other infrastructure.
- Shortages of technical and managerial expertise.
- Corruption in government bureaucracies.
- Natural disasters, including the drought now entering its third year.

The dependence of the other states of the region on South African supply routes is also exploitable. For example, in 1981 Pretoria threatened to terminate a trade agreement with Zimbabwe that includes preferential customs duties and some quota guarantees on Zimbabwe's exports to the Republic, and also threatened to send home 40,000 Zimbabwean workers then in South Africa. Pretoria then precipitated a transport crisis by threatening to withdraw rolling stock on loan to the Zimbabwe railroad, but backed off as a result of outside pressure.

11. The political turmoil in neighboring states has also provided fertile ground for South African meddling. For example, Zimbabwe has alleged that Pretoria has recruited and supplied some of the dissidents operating in the troubled Matabeleland Province that abuts South Africa. While there is evidence of some South African involvement, the ethnic discord in Zimbabwe and the interparty battles that reflect it are

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a longstanding problem of indigenous origin. Zimbabwe's failure to resolve its internecine conflict will continue to provide the Republic with opportunities to destabilize the Mugabe government if South Africa deems such action necessary to fulfill its regional goals.

12. South Africa has been provided opportunities for intervention by the military weakness of its neighbors. Minimal amounts of aid to dissident groups can create havoc for states such as Lesotho or Mozambique. (These states are also open to direct attacks in Pretoria's anti-ANC campaign, illustrated dramatically in South African raids on Maseru in December 1982 and the bombing of ANC facilities in Maputo in May 1983.) Only Angola, with massive Soviet and Cuban support, has made a major effort to defend its territory against South African military incursions.

13. South Africa's neighbors are politically fragile. Many political structures are overly dependent upon a single leader and have yet to work out mechanisms for the peaceful transfer of power. Many of these leaders have failed to develop effective security systems, and because of their incompetence, particularly their inability to develop adequate economic policies, now face increasing disaffection.

14. South African policy toward exploitation of its neighbors' weaknesses is ambivalent. While Pretoria finds it useful to keep these states off balance, too much pressure could be counterproductive. South Africa does not want to be surrounded by excessively feeble states. Chaotic states cannot buy the Republic's goods and would offer little prospect for South African investors. Such states cannot enforce the terms of the nonaggression treaties South Africa is demanding and would provide a favorable environment for anti-South African movements. We believe the Republic will, therefore, keep the pressure on but will try to calibrate it carefully; to the extent that these countries cooperate with South African regional plans, they will generally be left alone to work out their internal political arrangements.

15. *The Long-Range Objective.* The long-term South African objective remains the formal establishment of the constellation of states that Botha has advocated since he came to power. The constellation is intended to replace the "cordon sanitaire" of European white-controlled territories (Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia) that collapsed in the mid-1970s. Pretoria has periodically raised the concept for public attention. The constellation of states would be codified by economic and political agreements that would create a regional bloc essentially controlled by the Republic. Among the advantages to Pretoria would be

at least indirect regional recognition of the independent homelands, which would form part of the constellation, by the other states that South Africa would like to have associated with it, namely, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and perhaps Zaire. Pretoria probably assumes that the creation of such a system would make it much more difficult for other African states, or any other power, to intervene in the region's affairs.

16. Pretoria's views of the Marxist states in the region will affect its plans for regional cooperation. Many South African decisionmakers would argue that mutually cooperative arrangements can be worked out regardless of the political systems prevailing in the black-ruled states. Other South African leaders are more ideologically oriented and would prefer a consistent policy of hostility toward Marxist or socialist regimes. The South African public has been conditioned by years of official rhetoric to regard Marxism as a direct and total threat to South African stability and survival. It would therefore seem difficult for Pretoria to associate freely with Marxist regimes. The results of bilateral cooperation under the new security agreements may help to modify South African perceptions, but the long-range South African expectation is that continuing pressures will force such regimes to modify their composition by including non-Marxist political groups, such as UNITA or the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO).

17. Although South Africa now seems willing to become more closely associated with the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government of Mozambique, its long-range goal of a constellation of states probably envisages modifications in the composition of regimes currently Marxist. In Angola, where South Africa has been deeply committed to UNITA for years, Pretoria no doubt wants reconciliation between UNITA and the MPLA government. Although South Africa's relationship with and commitment to RENAMO in Mozambique is less significant, Pretoria is actively promoting talks between Maputo and the insurgents. In Namibia, on the northwest border, a SWAPO government would also pose symbolic problems for the Republic. The granting of independence, in Pretoria's view, can include a possibly dominant role for SWAPO; but Pretoria will try to ensure that important posts go to other indigenous parties, and that constitutional guarantees preclude a one-party or Marxist state. In other countries—Malawi, Lesotho, and Botswana—Pretoria continues to favor the more conservative elements in the society, whether or not they hold power.

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18. Angola is the major policy problem for South Africa's regional planners. The Marxist MPLA government has over 30,000 Cuban troops and military advisers as well as several thousand Cuban civilian technicians assisting it in maintaining power. Their presence is a problem for a regime that aims at total dominance of the region, even though they pose no immediate threat to the Republic (Cuban troops perform basically defensive functions in Angola). Should the Cubans be invited by a SWAPO-led Namibia to assist it in its security operations, however, they would be seen by Pretoria as a much more immediate threat. Pretoria is intent upon managing Namibian independence in such a way as to prevent this. In the meantime, so long as the Cubans keep to their current posture, their presence serves a useful purpose for Pretoria by attracting US involvement in developments in southern Africa and by justifying South African arguments of a Soviet-Cuban military threat to the region.

19. South African regional policies are based on pragmatic self-interest and are supported by most of the white community. For the period of this Estimate, the nonaggression pacts resulting from these policies are likely to hold. The neighboring states are bitterly aware of the risk they run in permitting the ANC to use their territory, because they would not be able to defend themselves against South African military action if they engage in behavior Pretoria feels is hostile to its interests, and because they desperately need South African trade, aid, and investment.

### The Regional Military Situation

#### The South African Defense Force (SADF)

20. South Africa is the dominant military power in southern Africa. Its military forces are not only larger and more efficient than any of the neighboring black states, but are also highly motivated, well disciplined, and thoroughly trained. The active-duty force numbers over 94,000; if needed, Pretoria could muster an estimated 300,000 men in 30 days through a general mobilization. The South African Defense Force is capable of mounting an aggressive and coordinated military response to perceived threats.

21. Most SADF personnel are white South Africans, but because of competing demands from the military and civilian sectors, increased use of nonwhite personnel on a voluntary basis is taking place. Only white males, however, are presently subject to draft and reserve obligations. The current system drafts about 25,000 white males and accepts a few thousand volunteers (white males and females, and a few black,

Colored, and Indian males) each year. Only about 8,000 nonwhites are now in the SADF ranks; but, should Coloreds and Indians become subject to the draft as a consequence of the limited political participation for their communities under the new Constitution, these numbers could increase sharply. Some Colored and black troops have already seen combat and may assume more of the burden in the future as an alternative to additional increases in the military obligation of whites. These troops will also probably receive more equitable treatment within the armed forces than nonwhites normally enjoy in civilian life; the SADF's pragmatic interest in improved performance has already led it to adopt policies designed to promote greater racial tolerance among its troops.

22. Despite the increased importance of nonwhites in the military, the defense of the country will ultimately remain the responsibility of the white population. White males are now liable for two years of active service followed by 12 years of reserve duty, during which 720 days must be spent on active duty. Whites must then fulfill a continuing reserve obligation until the age of 55.

23. Despite budgetary increases, there are problems facing the SADF, among them the spotty quality of leadership at the small-unit level. Career officers and noncommissioned officers are seldom assigned below the company level, even though counterinsurgency warfare is fought at the section, team, squad, and platoon levels. Thus, in Namibian and Angolan field operations, the SADF has experienced incidents of faulty mapreading, disregard of authority, false combat reports, and the like.

24. Another leadership problem comes from South Africa's military isolation, which has meant that almost all military training must be done in country. In recent years, the lack of contact with other military establishments and staff colleges has resulted in gaps in SADF knowledge about new concepts and methodologies. Training, particularly at the staff college level and above, has suffered. The system is now producing senior officers with parochial vision and little or no appreciation of the world beyond South Africa's borders.

25. Nonetheless, by Western standards, the quality of SADF military training is at least adequate. The training available is carefully planned and thorough, with heavy emphasis on field work. The large reserve force (the Citizen Force—CF) is organized for conventional warfare, while both the standing army (Permanent Force—PF) and the reserves are trained for counterinsurgency operations where the government



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believes the greatest near-term threat to its security will arise.

26. The SADF remains equipped largely with obsolescent but serviceable equipment that is adequate to meet the military threat it now faces. While most of the active units are equipped with modern weapons, the basic machinegun remains the Browning 30 caliber, and its main antitank gun is a low-velocity 90-millimeter gun. The SADF lacks modern antiaircraft defense systems, except for a few Soviet systems captured in Angola.

27. Deficiencies in its arms inventory are the consequences of the international isolation inflicted by two United Nations arms embargoes, voluntary in 1963 and mandatory in 1977. In the mid-1960s, South African defense planners initiated policies designed to reduce the country's dependence on foreign equipment. They have since developed channels to foreign countries and international armaments dealers in an effort to circumvent the embargo by covert procurement of weapons and technology. South Africa has also developed the largest indigenous arms industry in Africa. The government-controlled Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) has become one of the country's largest industrial conglomerates. Tasked specifically to develop and procure weapons, ammunition, and technology based on the needs of the SADF, ARMSCOR covers the entire process of weapons production from research through manufacture, servicing, and repair, and currently meets the bulk of the military's requirements for ground force equipment. It also procures weapons from private firms.

28. South African efforts to circumvent the embargo have had mixed results. South Africa is able to produce a vast range of weaponry, much of which—small arms, ammunition, and armored vehicles—is important for counterinsurgency operations. With the help of foreign technology, it has produced such sophisticated items as the extended range G-5 155-mm gun and missile-carrying patrol boats. The SADF extends the life of its aging equipment by fabrication and by paying high prices for spare parts on the clandestine international arms market.

29. But these actions do not entirely compensate for South African inadequacies. The SADF lacks some state-of-the-art military equipment, particularly high-performance jet aircraft and helicopters. It has no replacements for its just-retired Shackleton long-range reconnaissance aircraft. South Africa also believes it needs to develop a submarine production capability. Even the present level of self-sufficiency in arms

production has been costly. The research and development and production costs of home-produced items has led ARMSCOR to begin an intensive search for foreign partners and customers to help sustain production lines.

30. For the period of this Estimate, South Africa will continue to develop an indigenous arms production capability and to procure foreign equipment or technology through open or clandestine means. Much of this effort will be directed toward Western countries, particularly the United States. Some South African weapon systems already have lost their qualitative advantages over Soviet-supplied weapons in the neighboring black-ruled states.

31. South Africa's defense policy also has a nuclear dimension. Pretoria's sense of isolation and perception of the military threat in southern Africa in the mid-1970s induced Pretoria to accelerate the nuclear explosives research and development program that it had formally launched in 1973. By 1977, South Africa had constructed a nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert and appeared well on the way toward testing a nuclear explosives device. The international outcry that followed the discovery of the Kalahari site forced Pretoria to back off, however. A mysterious flash in the South Atlantic Ocean in September 1979 spurred further fears in the international community that South Africa finally had carried out a test, even though the available evidence was not conclusive. Nevertheless, the existence of the Kalahari site and the flash were enough to raise concerns abroad about South Africa's nuclear capability. Since then, Pretoria has followed a policy of calculated ambiguity by intimating that it has a nuclear weapons capability while disavowing any interest in producing or testing a nuclear device.

32. South Africa's aid to insurgencies for the remainder of the decade will fluctuate, depending on Pretoria's perceptions of the advantages to be gained from cooperation with the regimes in power and on its own overall regional strategy. For the next few years at least, Pretoria will be reluctant to abandon the leverage that involvement with opposition groups provides. South Africa probably will continue to aid UNITA, but is unlikely to renew its large-scale aid to RENAMO as long as the Mozambican Government lives up to its side of the Nkomati agreements.

33. As the ANC's sanctuaries in the region are closed out, one South African motive for waging cross-border counterinsurgency campaigns will diminish, although counterinsurgency training will continue to

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have a high priority. The South African Police and the Commandos (locally based militia groups reported to number 200,000 members) will probably be able to handle the ANC externally based challenge without much difficulty for the rest of the 1980s. But the South African military may increasingly be forced to concentrate on internal security matters. Turmoil resulting from rising black expectations may be more difficult to control. The threat from random urban terrorism will grow, as both left- and right-wing groups may decide that violent confrontation is the best means to focus government attention on their demands. But the regime is unlikely to face a serious threat to its stability from such groups for the period of this Estimate.

#### Military Capabilities of the Neighboring States

34. None of the neighboring states, individually or collectively, can challenge South African military dominance. Nonetheless, the South Africans are seriously concerned by the continuing deliveries of Communist military equipment to neighboring states and the presence of foreign troops and advisers in those countries. The systems so far acquired by these countries, though, are for the most part defensive.

35. At present, Mozambique, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho, and Angola have Soviet Bloc military equipment. The major recipients have been Angola and Mozambique. Angola has received initial shipments of SU-22 (Fitters) and MIG-23 (Floggers) jet aircraft and MI 24/25 (Hind) helicopters. Mozambique has been supplied with MIG-21 (Fishbed) jets and MI 24/25 helicopters.

36. South Africa is concerned about the improved air defenses in both countries, and the vulnerability of its irreplaceable aircraft to missile systems now in place, particularly in Angola. In addition, in its December 1983 incursion into Angola, SADF leaders found that their armored cars were ineffective against Soviet tanks. The Cuban presence in Angola, moreover, restrains South Africa's ability to project its force far into that country.

37. But although South Africa's regional dominance is not in danger of being challenged for the course of this Estimate, the SADF is not a juggernaut. If the arms embargo holds, with South Africa continuing to be denied access to state-of-the-art equipment and technology—particularly with regard to advanced jet aircraft—and, if additional large-scale deliveries of modern equipment improve further defensive capabilities of neighboring states, South African cross-

**Table 1**  
**Armed Forces Personnel in Southern Africa <sup>a</sup>**

Country	Army	Navy	Air	Army/ Air Force	Total
<b>Frontline States</b>					
Angola	35,000	1,500		2,000	38,500
Botswana	3,150 <sup>b</sup>			50	3,200
Mozambique	32,000 <sup>c</sup>	700		1,000	33,700
Tanzania	39,800	800		1,000	41,600
Zambia	12,500			1,800	14,300
Zimbabwe	40,200 <sup>d</sup>			800	41,000
<b>Total</b>					<b>172,300</b>
<b>Other States <sup>e</sup></b>					
Lesotho	2,000			20	2,020
Malawi	6,000	100		55	6,155
Swaziland	2,700			Unknown	2,700 +
<b>Total</b>					<b>10,875 +</b>
<b>South Africa <sup>f</sup></b>	<b>76,500</b>	<b>6,600</b>		<b>11,300</b>	<b>94,400</b>

<sup>a</sup> These figures do not include either paramilitary forces (gendarmes, police, militia, and border guard—except where noted) or reserve strength.

<sup>b</sup> Botswana Defense Force is made up of five infantry companies.

<sup>c</sup> Includes border guard.

<sup>d</sup> Includes 50 personnel in Army Patrol Boat Squadron.

<sup>e</sup> Although Zaire is addressed in other sections of this paper, it is not considered part of the military composition identified with southern Africa.

<sup>f</sup> Includes 12,000 South African Defense Force personnel inside Namibia, but does not include an estimated 10,000 personnel in the South-West Africa Territory Force.

border operations could be hampered. South Africa does not face a serious conventional threat from adversaries on its borders.

38. The combined manpower strength of the neighboring states' armies far outnumbers the troops South Africa can muster (see table 1), but these forces are ineffective. The African armies are poorly trained, supported, housed, and paid. They lack technical skills, and, not surprisingly, are often demoralized. These armies are also riven by tribal rivalries and, in many instances, cannot comprehend the concept of a national interest that transcends tribal boundaries. None of these deficiencies is likely to disappear during the next decade.

39. But this imbalance between South Africa and its neighbors is double edged. If South Africa is able to persuade its neighbors that its intentions are peaceful, the past trends of escalating violence and arms build-

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ups could be halted or reversed. Much will depend on South Africa's future policies toward support of insurgent movements in neighboring countries. If it were to cease to provide assistance to them—as it seems now to have done to RENAMO—the prospects are good. Yet ideology plays an important part in South African policy. UNITA and RENAMO may appear, to some South African leaders, as more attractive than the Marxist regimes now in power in terms of the kind of regional political environment that South Africa believes would be most beneficial for its interests.

### Regional Economic Considerations

#### South Africa's Internal Economic Situation

40. South Africa is likely to experience continued low economic growth through the 1980s. The effect of this trend on domestic and foreign policy will be gradual, as economic constraints will not halt the ruling National Party's determination to protect the country's security and to retain Afrikaner political control. The financial pinch, however, will engender a sense of insecurity among Afrikaners, perhaps demonstrated in increased aggressiveness both at home and in the region.

41. Budgetary constraints, moreover, already have had some impact and no doubt contributed to the South African decision to accelerate the Namibian independence process and to work out an accommodation with Angola. The budgetary drain will continue to be a factor in South African planning for Namibia, but we do not believe that financial considerations alone will determine South Africa's policy on Namibia.

42. Economic growth projections will be unreliable indicators for predicting the timing or magnitude of racial unrest in South Africa. Pretoria's economic policy makers are unlikely to interpret incidents of racial unrest as a compelling inducement to ease growth constraints as a way of dampening black unemployment. Pretoria will continue to make decisions with an eye primarily to maintaining the economy's solvency, with lower priority for political and social consequences.

43. *The Importance of Gold.* Gold has been the key to South African economic growth, paying for half of total annual imports, including those capital goods critical to economic growth. But gold production, as a result of an apparently irreversible decline in the richest ore reserves, has declined fairly steadily for more than a decade, slipping from a high of 1,000 metric tons in 1970 to about 655 tons in 1981. Lower gold output has shrunk the contribution of overall mining receipts to real GDP from 18 percent in 1970

**Table 2**  
**South Africa: Gold Holdings,  
Production and Sales, 1970-83**

Metric tons

	Gold in Government Bank Vaults <sup>a</sup>	Gold Production	Gold Sales	
			Total	From Stocks
1970	592	1,000	1,399	399
1971	365	976	1,203	227
1972	558	910	717	0
1973	591	855	822	0
1974	568	759	782	23
1975	552	713	729	16
1976	394	713	871	158
1977	302	700	792	92
1978	304	704	702	0
1979	312	703	695	0
1980	378	673	607	0
1981	289	656	745	89
1982	235	662	706	44
1983	242	664	657	0

<sup>a</sup> End of year.

to 11 percent in 1983, even though production of minerals other than gold increased by about 75 percent. (See table 2.)

44. Foreign exchange shortages would have been much more severe had there not been steep, speculative increases in the price of gold in the mid-1970s and in 1980. Increased earnings from gold sales—from an average of \$1.8 billion a year in 1970-73 to over \$10 billion a year in the 1980s thus far—offset slightly more than half of the increase in the average annual cost of imports and net services (from \$5 billion in 1970-73 to nearly \$21 billion in 1980-83).

45. Foreign exchange constraints have led periodically to fiscal and monetary policies that deliberately sacrifice economic growth to stifle import demand. This tight-fisted approach was the principal cause for the decline in the average rate of economic growth from 5.7 percent in the 1960s to 2.8 percent since 1970. Even if figures for the past three years of severe drought and worldwide recession were to be factored out, the average annual rate of South African economic growth (1971-80) still would be less than 4 percent.

46. Slight increases in gold production have occurred since 1981. Output will continue to be largely static, with perhaps a slight increase up to the late 1980s.

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*South Africa's Economic Options*

47. Unless gold prices again rise, Pretoria will not be able to avoid future balance-of-payments predicaments that will lead it to constrict growth. Apart from hoping for new gold discoveries or for large, sustained price increases, South Africa has essentially only two alternatives to periodic clampdowns on growth.

48. The first option—substantial increases in public and private borrowing from Western banks—probably already troubles economic decision makers in Pretoria; South Africa's foreign debt has increased from about \$7 billion in 1980 to more than \$15 billion in 1984. Further increases on any major scale are unlikely because:

- They would mark a significant departure from the pattern of economic fine-tuning in effect since the beginning of the decline in gold production.
- They would provide a potential point of leverage to foreign critics of the South African racial system.
- They would clash with Calvinist-based Afrikaner views of heavy debt as immoral.

49. Policymakers in Pretoria have long recognized that their more desirable option would be to increase nongold exports. The long-term performance of these exports has been good. Nongold exports grew by a respectable average of 20 percent annually during the period 1971-80, but have declined by one-fifth since 1980 (see table 3). This decline—the first in 25 years—resulted from:

- Reduced demand resulting from economic recession in the principal markets: Western Europe, the United States, and Japan.
- Severe drought in 1983 and 1984, which halted corn exports.

This combination of factors has kept the growth of nongold exports from offsetting the rise in the cost of imports.

*Prospects for Economic Growth in the 1980s*

50. The South African Government will continue to restrict economic growth periodically to minimize current account deficits, timed largely by speculative swings in gold prices. An increase of \$100 an ounce in gold prices, for example, would raise the value of annual gold production by \$2.1 billion at the current rate of output. The chances for a significant increase

**Table 3**  
**South Africa: Major Exports**

Million US \$

	1970	1980	1983 <sup>a</sup>
Total	3,651	24,455	18,725
Gold	1,617	11,902	8,925
Nongold	2,034	12,553	9,800
Of which:			
Coal	16	932	1,082
Diamonds	274	1,622	1,184
Platinum group metals <sup>a</sup>	NA <sup>b</sup>	900	700
Metallic ores	132	716	463
Ferroalloys	48	503	358
Corn	75	538	164

<sup>a</sup> Estimated.<sup>b</sup> Not available.

in gold prices—back to the \$800 to \$900 levels of 1980—are poor, however, without an inflationary surge in the United States and other industrial nations, or some other unpredictable factor such as a major intensification of conflict in the Middle East, default by one or more of the principal debtor nations, or faltering of the US economic recovery. Given the unpredictability of gold prices, South Africa's annual rate of real economic growth in 1984-90 is likely to average only about 2.5 to 3.0 percent.

*The Regional Economic Situation*

51. Despite the limitations for sustained growth predicted, South Africa's economic growth during 1978-83 averaged more than four times the pace of the combined average rate of its 10 nearest regional neighbors—Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (see table 4). South African GDP accounted for three-fourths of the regional total in 1983. Zimbabwe was second, with a GDP less than one-tenth of South Africa's total, and only one-third as large on a per capita basis. South African GDP, moreover, totaled three and a half times the combined output of the members of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference, the regional grouping of nine of South Africa's neighbors—excluding Zaire—that was designed to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa, and this gap will not narrow significantly during the period of this Estimate.

52. *Regional Economic Linkages.* Business initiatives by South African companies and public corpora-

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**Table 4**  
**Selected Economic Comparisons of**  
**Southern African Countries**

	GDP 1983 ( <i>Billion US \$</i> )	GDP per Capita, 1983 ( <i>US \$</i> )	Average Annual Real Growth in GDP, 1978-83 ( <i>Percent</i> )	Total Trade, 1982 ( <i>Billion</i> <i>US \$</i> )	Employment in Manufacturing ( <i>Thousand persons</i> )	Populations 1983 ( <i>Million persons</i> )
South Africa	79.0	2,600	2.5	34.0	1,474	30.9
Other southern Africa	26.6	290	0.6	13.2	549	91.7
Of which:						
Angola	3.6	470	0	2.8	10 <sup>a</sup>	7.6
Botswana	0.9	900	12.1	1.0	4	1.0
Lesotho	0.4 <sup>a</sup>	290	10.0 <sup>a</sup>	0.5	4	1.4
Malawi	1.3	200	3.3	0.5	42	6.6
Mozambique	1.5	120	-3.0 <sup>a</sup>	0.4 <sup>a</sup>	20 <sup>a</sup>	13.0
Swaziland	0.7	1,170 <sup>a</sup>	3.5	0.7	14	0.6
Tanzania	4.6	220	-0.4	1.7 <sup>b</sup>	100	20.5
Zaire	3.6 <sup>a</sup>	120	0	0.9	100	31.2
Zambia	3.4	540	0.6	1.9	80	6.3
Zimbabwe	6.5 <sup>a</sup>	800	4.2	2.8	175	8.1
SADCC <sup>c</sup>	22.9	380	0.7	12.3	449	60.5

<sup>a</sup> Estimated

<sup>b</sup> Data are for 1981.

<sup>c</sup> SADCC includes all of the listed countries except South Africa and Zaire.

tions and the attraction of job and marketing opportunities in South Africa have created a web of economic ties between South Africa and most southern African black states. While the regional economic ties are beneficial to both South Africa and its neighbors, the vast difference in size and degree of self-sufficiency between the former's economy and the collective economies of the others makes the ties much more important to the smaller countries.

53. **Transport Ties.** All of the southern African nations except Lesotho are linked by rail to eight ports in South Africa and Namibia. Lesotho, an enclave within South Africa, uses truck routes from South African ports. The five landlocked countries on the rail system—Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—and the Shaba Region of Zaire are forced to rely mainly on South African ports, because guerrilla activity and poor maintenance on the rail links to the Angolan port of Lobito and to Mozambique's three ports seriously reduce the capacity of these alternative outlets. Zaire's port at Matadi, and Tanzania's at Dar es Salaam, which is connected to the common rail system, could not handle more than their present traffic without substantial upgrading of facilities.

54. **Nontransport Ties.** The three major nontransport ties—trade, investment, and migrant labor—are net earners of foreign exchange for South Africa. In 1980, South Africa netted \$1.8 billion from these relationships (see table 5). South Africa is the source of about one-third of the region's imports, including practically all of the imports of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, although most of the neighboring states have their largest export market overseas.

55. Remittances to the black states by more than 200,000 migrant workers in South Africa totaled \$400-500 million in 1983. Such remittances are major sources of foreign exchange for Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Swaziland. For South Africa, access to foreign migrants provides a much larger—and thus cheaper—pool of labor than would otherwise be available. This is particularly important to the mining sector, which relies on migrants for slightly more than one-fourth of its black labor force. (See table 6.)

56. South Africa is also the major source of capital investment in the region, taking in more from dividends and profits on the operation of the branches and subsidiaries of South African companies in these

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**Table 5**  
South Africa: Trade with Selected  
Neighboring States

	1980 (Million US \$)	Share of Partner- Country Trade (Percent)	1983 (Million US \$)
Exports	24,455		18,725
To southern Africa	2,378	32	
Of which:			
Angola <sup>a</sup>	25	2	
Botswana	600	87	
Lesotho	450	97	
Malawi	162	37	
Mozambique <sup>a</sup>	50	20	
Swaziland	561	93	
Tanzania <sup>a</sup>	14	1	
Zaire <sup>b</sup>	NA	NA	
Zambia <sup>c</sup>	81	11	
Zimbabwe <sup>c</sup>	435	27	
Imports	15,200		15,000
From southern Africa	603	9	
Of which:			
Angola	100	5	
Botswana	33	7	
Lesotho	24	41	
Malawi	9	3	
Mozambique	15	10	
Swaziland	106	30	
Tanzania	12	2	
Zaire	NA <sup>d</sup>	NA <sup>d</sup>	
Zambia	5	NEGL.	
Zimbabwe	299	22	

<sup>a</sup> Estimated.<sup>b</sup> Data are for 1979.<sup>c</sup> Data are for 1981.<sup>d</sup> Not available.

neighboring states than is returned in the form of new funding for capital investment.

57. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are the most dependent: *Botswana* for investment and technical and managerial inputs to mining (one-fourth of GDP), *Lesotho* for remittances from migrant labor (three-fourths of GDP), and *Swaziland* for revenues from tourism and for investment (probably more than three-

**Table 6**  
South Africa: Origin of Foreign  
Mine Workers <sup>a</sup>

Thousand Persons

	1970	1975	1980	1983
Total	303	262	215	213
Of which:				
Angola	— <sup>b</sup>	—	—	—
Botswana	16	17	17	18
Lesotho	71	105	121	117
Malawi	90 <sup>c</sup>	5 <sup>c</sup>	14	16
Mozambique	113	118	38	45
Swaziland	5	7	18	12
Tanzania	—	—	—	—
Zaire	—	—	—	—
Zambia	—	—	—	—
Zimbabwe	8 <sup>c</sup>	10 <sup>c</sup>	7	5

<sup>a</sup> Since 1980, mine workers have made up about two-thirds of the total number of migrant workers in South Africa from the southern African region, according to our estimates.

<sup>b</sup> Dashes indicate less than 5,000 workers.

<sup>c</sup> Estimated.

fourths of GDP). South Africa also provides an element of grant aid to all three through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), an organization created to promote regional trade during the colonial period. Allocations from SACU, including the grant aid, make up more than half of the total government revenues of Lesotho and Swaziland and about one-third of Botswana's.

58. Mozambique's experience since independence in 1975 illustrates the importance of South Africa to the smaller regional economies. Before independence, fees from port and rail shipments, remittances from migrant labor (including a large element of grant aid), and tourist spending totaled a South African transfer to Mozambique of more than \$200 million annually in foreign exchange, roughly offsetting the latter's chronic overseas trade deficit. After independence, mutual political distrust and a steep decline in the reliability of Mozambican transportation facilities (following the 1975-76 departure of Portuguese technicians) induced South Africa to reduce its trade shipments through Maputo, cut hiring of migrant labor, and virtually end tourist travel. The severing of these revenues was a major factor in Mozambique's subsequent disastrous economic performance. Renewal of economic ties with South Africa was thus one of the principal incentives for Maputo to sign the Nkomati mutual security agreement in March 1984.

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59. The Zimbabwean economy is the most sensitive in the region to swings in South African consumer spending, as sales of manufactured goods in the relatively large South African market account for more than one-fourth of total Zimbabwean exports. This linkage, and the similarity of South African and Zimbabwean mineral exports and weather patterns, tend to result in tandem economic growth trends for the two economies.

60. Among the other states, Malawi, Zaire, and Zambia import South African manufactured goods and look to South African companies for technical expertise, investment capital, and entrepreneurial initiatives. Angola and Tanzania disclaim any significant economic relations with South Africa, but scattered reporting indicates that South African canned foods and other processed goods appear from time to time on their store shelves and on black markets. Angola relies on DeBeers Corporation of South Africa to operate its diamond mines.

#### Prospects for the Regional Economies

61. Average economic growth by South Africa's regional neighbors probably will rise marginally during the last half of the 1980s, but it is unlikely to match or exceed the expected 2.5- to 3.0-percent growth rate in South Africa. The entire region will suffer from the impact of stagnant gold production in South Africa, decline in expansion of South African demand for migrant labor and imported commodities, and a reduced availability of South African venture funds for capital investment. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland will be hurt because the rate of growth of customs revenues will fall as South Africa cuts imports.

62. Although Zimbabwe and Mozambique can look forward with fair confidence to improved growth, these prospects are derived from the likely end of the three-year drought rather than any surge in development. Mozambique also may benefit to some extent from the Nkomati Accord if the government can bring the insurgency under control.

63. Malawi and Swaziland have good prospects for maintaining the 3.0- to 3.5-percent average annual rates of growth that they generally have been able to achieve since the mid-1970s, thanks to policies that encourage economic relations with South Africa and take advantage of their limited agricultural potential. Malawi and (to a lesser degree) Swaziland have been grappling with transport problems caused by the deterioration of Mozambican rails and ports, problems that could ease over the next few years as a result of

the Nkomati Accord. Economic performance so far indicates that the austerity measures imposed as a condition for debt relief will not significantly reduce Malawi's growth rate.

64. Angola would benefit from an end to civil war or a surge in international oil prices, but prospects for growth during the rest of the decade are uncertain.

65. Economic growth in Botswana and Lesotho almost certainly will average sharply lower rates through the rest of the 1980s. Their past high growth has been the result mainly of large investments by South Africa's DeBeers and Anglo-American corporations in mining and—in Lesotho—of substantial wage increases by South African mines to migrant workers. Neither can expect new mining investments, and both will now suffer the consequences—through their membership in SACU—of Pretoria's gold-related economic curbs.

66. *Prospects for Increased Regional Ties.* The creation of SADCC in April 1980 and of Pretoria's counterorganization in September 1983—the Southern African Development Bank (SADB), of which South Africa is the sole member so far—have resulted in no significant changes in the economic ties between South Africa and its regional neighbors. These two organizations were established with conflicting goals. While SADCC aims to reduce South Africa's economic and political regional leverage, SADB's goal is to strengthen Pretoria's regional influence through increased economic ties. SADCC is unlikely to be successful since its economic strength will reflect the limited prospects for growth of its members.

67. Although most of South Africa's neighbors will continue to spurn membership in SADB, attractive financial incentives by Pretoria may induce one or more of the smaller members of SACU to join before the end of the decade. Pretoria can offer incentives without significantly adding to its budgetary expenditures. For example, according to press reports, it is planning to make available about \$300 million a year in development money to SADB, almost as much as Lesotho's GDP, but only about 1.5 percent of Pretoria's \$20 billion annual budget.

68. Most economic forces will tend to strengthen South African regional preeminence. Refurbishment of Mozambique's rail and port system, for example, as a result of the Nkomati Accord and increased foreign aid, could be the most dramatic regional economic accomplishment during the period. Ironically, however, the renewed profitability of Mozambique's rails and ports probably would depend on Pretoria's will

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ingness to transfer to Maputo tonnage now shipped through Durban from its mines in the Transvaal. While this would enable Pretoria to reduce its own shipping costs, it would make South Africa the major user of the port of Maputo by a large margin, thus undermining SADCC's major goal of reducing its dependence on South African transport.

### South African Internal Politics

69. South Africa in the mid-1980s is undergoing major social and economic changes, which are beginning to be reflected in the country's political institutions. The government's success in coping with its domestic problems will directly influence South Africa's role as a regional power.

70. The ruling National Party (NP) is an important indicator of these societal changes. Its constituency has become more urban, better educated, wealthier, and many of its members seem less resistant to change. Those who have been less willing to consider new ways have been read out of the party, and other Afrikaner cultural and social institutions are also becoming seriously divided. Alternative institutions are also being formed. The NP has lost large numbers of the white working class to parties on its right, particularly to the Conservative Party founded in 1982 by Andries Treurnicht, the former cabinet minister and leader of the Transvaal NP (the largest provincial party organization). On the other hand, the NP is picking up strength among the new professional elites, including the English speakers, and in general the NP in 1984 appears to occupy the center of the political debate.

71. Botha over the last five years has been simultaneously consolidating his own power base and preparing an agenda for drastic modification of South African national institutions. These changes are primarily designed to protect white, and primarily Afrikaner, control of the political and economic systems, but also to strengthen the executive branch of the government. As the new President, Botha is in a better position to push through his political program. For the next few years, Botha can be expected to dominate the South African political scene.

72. Botha has already radically revised the South African decisionmaking system, reducing the authority of the National Party and the Parliament while simultaneously enlarging the national security bureaucracy. In the past five years, Botha and a coterie of advisers from the military, police, and intelligence services, as well as a few trusted cronies from the National Party, have streamlined the government by reducing the

number of departments from 39 to 22 and the number of Cabinet committees from 20 to four. The military and civilian components of the South African intelligence establishment have also been modernized in an effort to make it a more effective tool of the President.

73. The most important Cabinet committee, the State Security Council (SSC), plays a key role in coordinating policy on national security, interpreting its mandate broadly. SSC membership includes the country's principal decisionmakers—the Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Law and Order; the senior Cabinet member; the commanding general of the defense forces, the Commissioner of Police; the director of the civilian intelligence service; and senior civil servants. President Botha serves as the chairman.

74. Although military influence has increased under Botha, the military does not dominate national security decisionmaking. Political power remains firmly in the hands of the President and a few senior National Party associates.

75. During the next two to five years, as South Africa institutionalizes limited constitutional reforms, executive decisionmaking will continue along the lines that Botha has developed. The restructuring of the white Parliament into a tricameral, multiracial legislature (with Colored and Indian participation) will almost certainly lead to a further concentration of power in the hands of the executive president. Botha and his successors will continue to use the SSC as a senior forum to coordinate security policy, but political power will remain firmly in the hands of the Afrikaner elite.

### South Africa's Constitutional Reforms

The new South African Constitution was approved by the white electorate in a referendum in November 1983 and became effective on 1 September 1984. It provides for a three-chamber Parliament, including two new houses for the Colored and Indian population groups. Elections for these two chambers were held in mid-1984. Under the constitution, the office of the state president was expanded and strengthened. P. W. Botha, formerly the Prime Minister, assumed this office. The new Parliament met briefly in September for its first session and will resume meeting in early 1985. Botha has now named one Colored and one Indian parliamentarian to his new Cabinet as ministers without portfolio. The new Constitution does not provide for black participation in the parliamentary system, but Botha has appointed a Cabinet committee to study this problem.



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76. Botha's goal is simple—the continuation of white control—but his plan for achieving it is complex. In effect, he will attempt to co-opt as many Coloreds and Asians as possible, and blacks residing in white areas, offering them limited political rights along with the hope of greater economic and social advantages—better education and health facilities, access to more skilled professions, and control over their community affairs. Entrenched resistance among conservative whites to reform must be overcome in order to realize even these goals. Botha began to warn his countrymen in 1983 that they must “adapt or die.” He himself seems committed to carrying out his version of political and social reform.

77. None of this alters the government's commitment to continuing separation of the races. Apartheid, as it now exists in South Africa, consists of both grand and petty apartheid. Petty apartheid—the network of rules and regulations that serve to separate the races in the use of certain public facilities—is already dying, and Botha is prepared to eliminate as many of the humiliating aspects of separate development as possible. Some progress along these lines has already been made.

78. But grand apartheid is an overarching design, enshrined in Afrikaner thinking, that mandates the physical separation of the races. It demands different residential communities for each race and, eventually, self-governing, independent homelands for as many blacks as are not needed to perform economic functions within white areas. Most blacks, under National Party doctrine, will become citizens of homelands and thereby lose their citizenship rights in South Africa.

79. The government has been forced, primarily by economic circumstance, to make some adjustments in apartheid policies over the years. While influx controls have been strengthened, the legal rights of many blacks to reside in “white” urban areas have been confirmed by, for instance, the provision of 99-year leasehold rights in certain black townships. Moreover, the President and many of his advisers are probably willing to make some adjustment on issues such as the laws governing marriage and immorality, if they calculate it will not prove too politically damaging with conservative Afrikanerdom. But the relocation and resettlement of black communities continues, even as the new constitutional reform program moves forward.

80. Despite the government's ambitious plans for economic development of the homelands, they remain economically unviable. Their primary sources of reve-

nue are and will be from subsidies by the South African Government and from wages of the unskilled laborers employed by the commerce and industry of white South Africa. Political independence, therefore, does not detract from the homelands' dependence on the white economy.

81. South African long-term political strategy seeks to find a method by which the homelands could be permanently linked to a white republic through some federal or confederal arrangement. President Botha presumably would like to see the creation of such a system during his term as executive president. However, South Africa will probably not be able to carry out its ultimate design for the homelands within the next five years, and this scheme is essential for its ultimate goal of the wider regional constellation of states.

82. But even while the government remains committed to confining as many blacks as possible to the homelands—and the next few years will see a steady continuation of resettlement and relocation—it must also deal with those blacks who cannot be assigned to homeland residence. The country's continuing economic development depends on black labor—and increasingly skilled workers at that—taking the jobs that a growing economy creates and that the small white labor force cannot fill. The government has reluctantly acknowledged this dependence, even though this trend undercuts the rationale for separate development. But the entry of blacks into the white economy, and thus into “white” South Africa, means that they will not be able to claim the political rights of homeland citizens.

83. The crux of government approach to the urban black problem is to build a skilled black work force that will develop in a tightly controlled system, thus driving a wedge between the poor, rural blacks of the homelands and a rising urban middle class. The issue of a national role for blacks has not yet been thrashed out, and probably will not be by the end of the decade. Government officials, however, have recognized the permanent presence of blacks in white areas and have even publicly hinted at a South African citizenship for them. The logic of the reform process that Botha has begun would seem to lead eventually to the inclusion of some blacks in the parliamentary system—most likely in the form of a separate chamber similar to those now occupied by Coloreds and Indians. Movement toward incorporation of some blacks into the parliamentary system will depend in part on the viability of the current tricameral arrangement in the next five years, and the extent to which Coloreds and Indians press for this change.

84. How will blacks respond to these government plans for them? The influence of black groups within and without the country is limited in its ability to affect government policies, but it cannot be entirely discounted. Black interest groups are divided along ideological, ethnic, and even generational lines. Whites can and often do play one off against another. A key dividing factor concerns the role of whites in the struggle for nonwhite rights. The banned African National Congress, founded in 1912, is a multiracial organization that encourages white participation in its antiapartheid activities. Although many leading officials of the ANC are members of the exiled South African Communist Party, the ANC officially does not espouse any single ideology. A political charter adopted by the ANC in 1955 is mildly socialist, and envisions the eventual establishment of a government in which all racial groups in South Africa are represented. Historically, the Pan-Africanist Congress, an ANC-offshoot, was the primary advocate of an alternative view that ruled out any white role in antigovernment protests. In the black politics of the mid-1980s, the traditional division is represented by the United Democratic Front (UDF), an alliance of several hundred groups from all races, and the National Forum Conference, an alliance of black groups that are dedicated to "black consciousness" concepts that were a driving force behind the 1976 unrest that began in Soweto.

85. The ANC is the most popular black organization according to various polls but has been in exile for over 20 years. Its interlocking ties with the outlawed South African Communist Party and its dependence on Soviet Bloc military aid have produced further tensions within the organization. Furthermore, as South Africa forces the neighboring black states to curtail ANC activities on their territories, its guerrilla capabilities will be weakened. The ANC is now faced with the need to strengthen its internal political base, or perhaps risk the loss of credibility as the one black force that can threaten white supremacy. The ANC probably has a rudimentary in-country political apparatus, but needs to do much more to build political appeal to blacks of all classes and ethnic backgrounds.

86. As the ANC moves toward an internal option, it could come into conflict with black groups already within the country, who also oppose the government. Nonetheless, there will be other pressures that may unify black groups as they press to win concessions from the state. The ANC has some 2,000 to 4,000 trained guerrillas in various countries throughout southern Africa, especially Angola. There are hundreds of members in exile who hold positions in the

group's political wing. The ANC's internal membership cannot be estimated. Virtually all of the ANC's military support comes from the Soviet Bloc, while most of its nonmilitary funding comes from Scandinavian states, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the United Nations. The ANC also maintains numerous large camps in southern Africa for South African refugees.

87. In recognition of this, South African security forces will continue and intensify, if necessary, their efforts to liquidate the ANC both at home and abroad. But systematic repression, particularly as there will be a spillover to other elements of the black community, may further alienate the very blacks the government hopes to co-opt. Therefore, despite the apparent diplomatic and military success of South African efforts to neutralize the ANC, it is still a potential rallying force, and it retains strong support both at home and abroad.

88. Another major sector of black society is organized on particularistic ethnic lines, principally through the Zulu-based Inkatha movement of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. Inkatha has tried to expand its claimed 1-million membership by recruiting in black townships, where many different ethnic groups may reside. Inkatha's successes in such expansion have been small, because many blacks fear Zulu dominance and consider Buthelezi, the Chief Minister of the Kwazulu homeland, a government collaborator. Nevertheless, Inkatha does wield considerable influence.

89. Beyond these broad, multipurpose groups are many others with narrower interests, which may or may not have ties to the major political groups. Among these are such groups as black labor unions, professional associations, and student groups. The black labor unions are of great importance in the Botha strategy for co-opting a skilled black labor force. They have grown rapidly in membership since they were legalized in 1979 and now total about 600,000 members. But the entire black work force is much larger and thus the potential of these unions is much greater, even if rural workers continue to be excluded. Security forces in South Africa closely monitor union activity. Those that are alleged to have ties to the ANC or other liberation groups must be extremely cautious if they are not to provoke strong control measures on their activities. Nonetheless, such careful government monitoring suggests official concern about their political potential.

90. Black politics are likely to be turbulent for the rest of the decade because of government inability or unwillingness to meet black demands. Government plans for a political dispensation are still in the very

early stages, and in any case fall far short of black expectations. In addition, the government will probably be stalled in its plans for economic co-option. The South African economy is in recession and its growth potential limited. These facts could work on blacks in two ways: those who have gained some economic advantages by participating in the system may, in a time of general retrenchment, be resigned simply to protecting these gains. But the vast majority of blacks have little to protect and will be more inclined to challenge the government openly—perhaps even violently. In particular, black students will continue to be in the forefront of nonwhite confrontations with the government. Students have mounted the most visible and violent protests. Therefore, even if the economy improves, the government may still face serious black dissatisfaction. Rising expectations create ferment; if they are inadequately satisfied, violence could again ensue.

91. Botha's policy of economic co-option, to create a quiescent black middle class that will settle for limited political rights, is thus inherently flawed, and probably will give way to further coercion. The government will adopt more sophisticated methods of control—the recent decline in the number of banings, for instance, suggests its intention to adopt less overtly repressive measures, and it is unlikely that a resurgence of black deaths in detention will occur. Such measures may defuse external criticism but they also indicate that the regime is firmly in control. Black dissatisfaction during this decade will not be sufficiently articulated to bring about black participation in national political institutions.

92. These are the internal political dynamics that will characterize the remainder of Botha's tenure as South Africa's chief executive. How long that will be is uncertain. The life of the present "white" Parliament expires in 1986, and Botha could choose to hold elections for all three chambers at that time. An alternative would be to extend the life of the present white chamber until 1989. Botha could leave office earlier, if political or personal motives were compelling. But he would be unwilling to do so until he could be certain his successor would be supportive of the policies he has introduced. Probable contenders that can be identified all have some liabilities.

93. Nor does it seem likely that Botha will be forced from the office of president which he assumed in September 1984. Afrikaners would be reluctant to engage in such proceedings, probably moving against Botha only if he were seriously physically disabled, suffered a series of major foreign policy reverses, or

ran into serious domestic political problems. None of these seem likely before 1989. South Africa has not had a scheduled transfer of power for nearly 25 years. The previous two changes of prime ministers have occurred in crisis situations, one an assassination and the other a resignation under fire due to a major government scandal. Therefore, the NP may not be anxious to face a leadership change during a period of political transition.

94. Nonetheless, this prognosis should not be read as implying that the South African power establishment will not face major problems for the rest of the decade. The political and economic trends of the late 1970s and 1980s ultimately work to the disadvantage of its white minority rulers. The departure of the right wing from the National Party has probably meant an irreparable split in Afrikanerdom.

95. Botha came into office with a reputation as a hardliner on racial questions. However, as a Cape Province politician, he immediately propounded a "reform" agenda, focused on providing limited political rights to the Coloreds. He has systematically consolidated his power over the last five years, dismissing from the party and government those who he thought might challenge his control, while winning allies from nongovernment elites—business and banking communities, universities, and the press, many of whom are English speakers. The white political parties to the left now seem in disarray and his only potential political threat lies to the right; but even this, given the new political balances, is probably manageable, as party and Parliament diminish in influence under the Botha constitution.

96. Botha then would seem well placed to implement his policies during the remainder of his term in office; that is, during the period of this Estimate. The problem appears to be one of direction rather than control; perhaps even Botha does not have a final agenda but intends only to deal with each new racial challenge on an ad hoc basis. But South African blacks are unlikely to defer their demands on the system until the present or a successor regime demonstrates its willingness to negotiate with them. Black expectations will be supported by friends and supporters abroad. Botha's new political system has not worked to resolve the crucial issue in South African domestic politics—that of equal rights for blacks. For the period of this Estimate, black discontent will continue to fester, with occasional violent outbursts, and have resonance beyond South Africa's borders. South African regional policy, therefore, will ultimately be hostage to South African unwillingness to govern equitably at home.

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## Outlook and Implications

### Outlook

97. The regional intentions of the South African Government are not likely to change during the period of this Estimate. The government will continue to pursue a strategy of neutralizing any potential threat to South African security from the neighboring black-ruled states. It is possible that Pretoria will face situations in the remaining years of the decade that could weaken its ability to project power throughout the region in order to protect its national security. Factors that would lead to a decline in South African hegemony and a return to regional tensions reminiscent of the late 1970s include:

- Unexpected improvement in the economies of the neighboring black African states.
- Reduction in the sociopolitical divisions within these states.
- The rise of new, more intransigent black leaders in the neighboring countries.
- A victory by the right wing in South Africa that negates President Botha's policies.
- Major increases in military assistance, in men or arms, from the Communists that redress the military weaknesses of the neighboring black states.
- The growth of serious internal black unrest in South Africa that diverts military personnel and resources to internal security functions and weakens the military's capabilities to wage aggressive external operations.

It is unlikely that any one or combination of the above will develop to the point that South Africa will be unable to carry out effectively its current regional policies. The chances of a dramatic improvement in the economies of the black African states in the time frame of this Estimate are remote at best. Indeed, the probable stagnation or decline of these economies will add to the endemic tribal and ideological rivalries that weaken the political cohesion of the neighboring states. The possible appearance in the next five years of new, more intransigent black leaders would be offset by the persistent internal political and social disarray and the economic imperatives of getting along in some fashion with South Africa. Even a victory of the right wing in South Africa, a remote prospect, would not greatly affect the regional policies, though it would introduce a harsher tone to the

relationships. Increases in military assistance by the Communists might stiffen the resistance of black African leaders to South African demands, but unless sizable Communist combat forces were to arrive—a most unlikely development—South African hegemony would not be threatened. New, serious black unrest within South Africa is, indeed, a likely prospect and might divert military personnel and resources from regional duties, but we judge that the will and capabilities of the South African security forces will be sufficient to contain the internal unrest and maintain the regional policies. Pretoria will, therefore, be able to maintain its effort of imposing a Pax Pretoriana upon its weaker neighbors.

98. Throughout the 1980s South Africa is almost certain to remain the dominant military power in the region and will also dominate the regional economy by virtue of its far greater wealth, technological superiority, and control over the main transportation links between the black-ruled states and the outside world. The combination of military superiority and economic incentives will be a strong inducement to the black-ruled states to live with the terms set by South Africa.

99. Nonetheless, the implementation and preservation of South Africa's policy of regional dominance are not likely to be as easy as the initial arrangements with Swaziland and Mozambique have suggested. If South Africa proves to be a generous partner in trade, aid, and development, external concern about South African hegemony could be defused. Pretoria may also gain at least indirect diplomatic recognition from more black governments, although it is highly unlikely any others will establish formal diplomatic ties.<sup>4</sup> But if the black states waver in the security commitments they have made to Pretoria, South Africa will be prepared to punish them through preemptive military or covert (destabilization) action or by squeezing them economically. Much will depend on how South Africa fulfills the commitments it now seems ready to undertake.

100. The black states are unlikely to become sufficiently strong, either in military, economic, or political terms, to challenge South Africa. Therefore, fearing renewed South African destabilization efforts, they will be unlikely to abrogate unilaterally their security agreements with Pretoria. The weakness of organizations such as the SADCC, even if much Western and international assistance is funneled to them, means they will provide much less direct benefit to most

<sup>4</sup> Malawi is the only black state to maintain diplomatic relations with South Africa.

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southern African states than would direct cooperation with Pretoria.

101. Most southern African states have client relationships with one or more Western or East European powers. Black states seeking to avoid South African dominance will no doubt appeal to former rulers and current patrons. Such appeals are unlikely to succeed. Western trade with, aid to, and investment in southern Africa may increase but not to the extent that Western influence will displace South African economic domination of the countries that are on its borders.

102. Also, although Moscow is clearly concerned about recent trends in southern Africa which it believes are not advantageous to its interests in the region, it has not translated this concern into increased offers of economic assistance and there are no indications it intends to do so. The Soviets will continue cooperation in the military sector with those countries where there are ongoing programs, even though the resources of the Soviet Union and its East European and Cuban allies are limited, and southern Africa is not now given a high priority in the list of major foreign policy concerns.

103. Establishment of the constellation of states will depend on South Africa's ability to convince those associated with it that it is in their interest to do so. South Africa does not seem to have a coherent plan for implementing its policy objectives. At present, South Africa's regional design runs counter to black Africa's hopes to distance itself from Pretoria. The economic and political benefits to the states now linked with the South African sphere of security agreements are unlikely to be sufficient to match the diplomatic pressures and internal opposition they are likely to provoke. Pressures from the rest of Africa on the southern states to avoid closer identification with South Africa will be strong, reinforcing the natural inclination of black leaders to retain their personal and political independence to the extent possible. They will resist South African efforts to dictate their internal and foreign policy priorities.

#### Implications

##### *For Black Africa*

104. Black Africa now faces a situation in southern Africa where South African strategic dominance seems assured. If most African leaders understand the necessity for South Africa's black neighbors to capitulate to Pretoria's demands, they fear the political and economic consequences of the new regional order. Black Africa has already been compelled to reassess the

position of the southern African liberation movements. SWAPO is being counseled by some states on South Africa's border to negotiate with Pretoria. ANC activities in neighboring states are being systematically restricted by host governments, and the rest of black Africa is unable to come to the direct assistance of the ANC. Although black states may object strenuously to the weakening of the ANC's military wing, they are unable to compel states bordering South Africa to host ANC insurgents and run the risk of future preemptive South African military actions. Economically, long-standing plans to reorient the transportation and communications network away from the Republic have not gotten off the ground, thus inflicting a serious setback on African plans for regional development. For the time being, black Africa seems powerless to challenge Pretoria's hegemony.

105. In the meantime, black Africa remains committed to the goals for southern Africa that it has consistently endorsed in the OAU, the Nonaligned Movement, the United Nations, and other international forums to which it has access. Africans demand independence for Namibia as the final step in eradicating the last vestige of colonialism from the African continent and insist on the removal of the apartheid system in South Africa and the eventual installation of majority rule. They support the two liberation movements in their efforts to bring about these changes.

106. Black Africa places a high premium on maintaining cohesion on major African issues. On southern African issues, the rest of the continent defers to the Frontline States—Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Angola, and Mozambique—in setting the policies. The Frontline has been basically supportive of the US-led initiative to bring Namibia to independence under the auspices of UN Resolution 435, but dubious about the ability of the US policy of constructive engagement to bring about fundamental change in South African domestic policy. Black Africa is unhappy with the slow pace of the Namibian negotiations and critical of moves to link Namibian independence to Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

107. Recent developments in southern Africa do not change black Africa's positions on these issues, but as the Africans realize their inability to deal with South Africa themselves, they will seek, perhaps more intensely than they have in the past, external assistance in trying to realize their objectives. Black African dependence and weakness has been highlighted by the emerging configuration in the southern part of the continent.

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*For the Soviets*

108. The Soviets view recent developments in the region with concern. Moscow is clearly apprehensive that South Africa's recent agreements with Angola and Mozambique could weaken the Soviet position in these key states and undermine its efforts to support SWAPO and the ANC, but it has not condemned the accords publicly. The Soviets are particularly disturbed by the Angolan and Mozambican decisions not to seek or accept Soviet advice, despite their established position as both countries' principal arms supplier. Moscow has not written off either regime, however, and will try to limit the damage to its regional interests by assuring that the bilateral security accords do not lead to a broader accommodation with South Africa.

109. The issue of Cuban troop withdrawal will be one litmus test. Both Havana and Moscow would consider such a request by the MPLA government a direct blow to their prestige and influence. But they may believe that they can count on South African intransigence on Namibia and the growing effectiveness of the UNITA insurgency to deflect this threat. Moreover, to the extent closer cooperation with South Africa offers some respite from military pressures, allowing both Luanda and Maputo to concentrate on their desperate economic crises, Moscow may even find aspects of the new relationship acceptable. The Soviets are unlikely to sit by and watch their influence erode. Moscow will continue to work behind the scenes to sustain black African suspicions of South African—and US—intentions. The success of these efforts could depend on how ably the South African leadership exploits the opening that its policies of "thump and talk" have provided for it.

110. In the interim, the Soviets will try to channel additional assistance to SWAPO and the ANC when possible. They will try to reinforce black African antipathy toward Pretoria by publicizing the various aspects of South African apartheid policies whenever possible. They will exploit opportunities such as the willingness of Jonathan in Lesotho to permit an increased Soviet presence (despite the dangers posed to Lesotho by the South African reaction to this). They will continue to press for a UN solution on Namibia, and will try to hold the United States to account if that process is long delayed. There are no indications that the Soviets believe they have lost the game.

*For the United States*

111. The United States' record of protracted and intense diplomacy on southern African issues over the last several years has placed it in an exposed position.

Washington is viewed as having a high degree of diplomatic credibility with black states and South Africa, and as a result is seen as the only possible mediator with Pretoria. Thus, the United States risks being seen as acquiescing in the South African-designed system for the region. This close identification will work in the US interest only insofar as this system provides positive benefits to the regional states.

112. But the new arrangements are inherently fragile, and could easily be disrupted by any number of factors. Thus, for instance, if the RENAMO and UNITA insurgencies persist, weak regional governments will blame continued South African support, and the United States will be held to account for not forcing the South Africans to cease their assistance. Continued economic decline in the area—whether caused by natural or political disaster—will similarly provoke a call for US help. But while US involvement in southern African matters will continue, US ability to influence regional developments, which now rests on its acceptability as a mediator to all parties, may decline. US ability to influence South Africa is far less than most black African leaders believe it is. The South African leadership is determined to exploit to the fullest its potential as the dominant military and economic power in the region. While Pretoria will be willing to cooperate with the United States in areas of common interest, particularly with regard to the Soviet and Cuban presence in the area, it would not welcome US involvement in internal matters. As South Africa perceives itself stronger, it will become less vulnerable to external pressure. Thus, US influence in both the Republic and black Africa may suffer.

*For the West*

113. The establishment in the short term of an imposed South African regional order may introduce a semblance of peace to the southern African region. But Pretoria's objective of becoming the center of a regional grouping around which black satellites will revolve introduces a new political and economic dimension. The black states will have less flexibility to determine their own policies. Their relations with non-African powers will be constrained by the need to accommodate South African interests.

114. The cement that is to hold the community together—an intricate network of economic links—will demand large financial inputs. But South Africa's resources are limited, and it cannot respond adequately to the development needs of the black states. South Africa has already raised the question of Western

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assistance to Mozambique and to an independent Namibia; it will try to persuade the United States and Western Europe of the benefits to be derived from participating in the new southern African institutions it seeks to develop. Such involvement would, however, tie the West overtly and directly to South African regional policies. Moreover, the envisaged new regional arrangements are inherently fragile. If black expectations are not fulfilled on both economic and security grounds, black leadership is likely to blame the West, as well as South Africa. If black leaders are seen by

opponents within the various ruling circles as being subservient to Pretoria, their prestige and legitimacy may be called into question. In these conditions, even a considerable improvement in economic conditions might not be sufficient to deter challenges to established authority by elements driven to assert black independence from South African domination. The prospects for peace and stability in the area thus could eventually be undermined. To the extent the West is perceived as an ally and supporter of South Africa, its prestige in black Africa will suffer.

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